William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 25 | Issue 4

Article 4

1999

Extended Jurisdiction Juveniles in Minnesota: a
Prosecutor'S Perspective
Kathryn A. Santelmann
Kari L. Lillesand

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Santelmann, Kathryn A. and Lillesand, Kari L. (1999) "Extended Jurisdiction Juveniles in Minnesota: a Prosecutor'S Perspective,"
William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 25: Iss. 4, Article 4.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Santelmann and Lillesand: Extended Jurisdiction Juveniles in Minnesota: a Prosecutor'S Pers

EXTENDED JURISDICTION JUVENILES IN MINNESOTA:
A PROSECUTOR'S PERSPECTIVE
Kathryn A. Santelmannt
Kari L. Lillesandtt
There is always a moment in a child's life when a door opens and
lets the future in.
- Graham Green
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1304
II.

THE 1994 STATUTORY CHANGES: CERTIFICATION

AN D Ejj ................................................................................. 1306

A . Overview ...................................................................
B. Eff. Expansion of theJuvenile Court's Sentencing

III.

1306

A uthority.........................................................................
1309
1994 STATUTORY CHANGES ................ 1313
Eff: StatisticalData....................................................
1314
ProbationViolation Data.............................................
1320

THE IMPACT OF THE

A.
B.

IV . CASELAW ............................................................................... 1323
V . CONCLUSION ........................................................................ 1335
t Kathryn A. Santelmann was appointed to head the Juvenile Prosecution
Section of the Ramsey County Attorney's Office in April, 1995. In addition to her
management responsibilities, Ms. Santelmann maintains a caseload, prosecuting
serious offenses and handling appellate matters. Ms. Santelmann also co-chairs
the Minnesota County Attorneys Association Juvenile Law Section and has taken
an active role in drafting legislation to address various juvenile delinquency issues.
She also serves on a number of other committees relating to juvenile law. Ms. Santelmann frequently provides training to lawyers, teachers, probation and police
officers on various topics ofjuvenile law. Ms. Santelmann received her law degree
from William Mitchell College of Law in 1985.
tt
Kari L. Lillesand, a third year student at William Mitchell College of Law,
is a law clerk in the Juvenile Division of the Ramsey County Attorney's Office.
The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions made to this article by
a number of people: Jim Hayes, Juvenile Division Director of the Ramsey County
Community Corrections Department; Fred Karasov, Managing Attorney of the
Hennepin County Juvenile Prosecution Division; and Heidi Green of the Minnesota Supreme Court Research and Technology Office. The authors express their
gratitude to these individuals and all those who provided assistance in the creation
of this article.

1303

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1999

1

William
Mitchell Law
Review, Vol.LAW
25, Iss.REVIEW
4 [1999], Art. 4
WILLIAM
MITCHELL

1304

[Vol. 25

I. INTRODUCTION

The creation of Minnesota's Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile
statute was part of a national trend to redefine the purpose of the
juvenile court by shifting the focus from rehabilitation to public
safety.' From 1988 to 1992, in a span ofjust four years, the number
of serious crimes, such as murder and assault, committed by juveniles increased by sixty-eight percent. 2 By 1991, forty-three percent
of persons apprehended for serious crimes were under the age of
eighteen! The rise in serious, violent juvenile crime rates occurring nationally also occurred in Minnesota.4
Since 1992, more than ninety percent of the states have revised
their laws relating to juvenile crime.5 Minnesota's revision of its
statute governing the transfer of juveniles to adult court and the
creation of a new category of juvenile offender-the Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile ("EJJ")-was part of this trend.6 Minnesota's EIJ
statute represents not only a shift in focus from rehabilitation to
the protection of public safety;7 it also represents an expansion of
the juvenile court's dispositional options.8 Furthermore, it is evidence of the increased role prosecutors and legislatures are playing
in cases involving the serious and violentjuvenile offender.9
In Minnesota, from 1980 to 1991 the overall crime rate had
decreased four percent.'0 However, this same period saw a four-

1.

See

PATRICIA TORBET ET AL.,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE RESPONSES TO

SERIOUS AND JUVENILE CRIME, 11 (July 1996); see also Barry Feld, Violent Youth and

Public Policy: A Case Study of Juvenile Justice Law Reform, 79 MINN. L. REV. 965, 967
(1995) (discussing legislative initiatives and judicial reforms in response to serious
youth crime).
2.

See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PROGRAM REPORT-JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM

INITIATIVES IN THE STATES: 1994-1996, 42 (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, JUVENILE JUSTICE: JUVENILES PROCESSED IN

CRIMINAL COURTS AND DISPOSmONS 1 (Aug. 1995)).
3.

See ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM, MINNESOTA

SUPREME COURT, FINAL REPORT 31 (Jan. 1994).
4.

See DANIEL STORKAMP, MINNESOTA CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

CENTER, MINNESOTA PLANNING: OVERVIEW OFJUVENILE CRIME IN MINNESOTA 5 (Feb.

26, 1993).
5. See TORBET ET AL., supranote 1, at 59.
6. See generallyFeld, supra note 1.
7.

See ADVISORY TASK FORCE, supranote 3, at 32.

8.

See id. at 32-33.

9.
10.

See TORBET ET AL., supra note 1, at 60.
See STORKAMP, supra note 4, at 5.
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percent increase in serious crime." Furthermore, the number of
juveniles arrested for serious crimes increased ten percent from
1980 to 1991.12 In 1991 alone, juveniles accounted for forty-three
percent of the total number of arrests for serious crimes.'3 In response to this rise in violent juvenile crime, the 1992 Legislature
created the Minnesota Task Force on the Juvenile Justice System
("Task Force") .

The Task Force was charged with the responsibility of examining the current juvenile system and making recommendations concerning, among other things, the process of transferring juveniles
to adult court."5 In fulfilling this charge, the Task Force examined
the policies and procedures used by the juvenile courts to deal with
serious and repeat offenders. 6 The Task Force also examined the
question of how the juvenile justice system should balance the
needs of the juvenile offender with the need to control the offender for the benefit of the juvenile and the protection of society. 7 This examination led to the following identified needs:
1. A stronger response to serious and repeat juvenile
crime;
2. A continuum of juvenile justice system responses to juvenile crime based on the seriousness of the offense, the
age of the offender, and the threat posed to public safety,
with an increase in sentencing alternatives for juvenile offenders; and
3. Strong leadership by the Department of Corrections in
developing statewide juvenile justice policy, and in taking
fiscal and program responsibility for serious juvenile offenders. 8
11. See id.
12. See id. at 6.
13. See id. For 1991, there were 17,688 juveniles arrested for serious offenses
out of a total population of 41,547. See id.
14. See 1992 Minn. Laws ch. 571, art. 7, sec. 13.
15. See id. The Task Force, chaired by Minnesota Supreme CourtJustice Sandra Gardebring, was comprised of 22 members and three ex officio members. See
ADVISORY TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 3-4. The membership included private citizens, community leaders, judges, legislators, law professors, law enforcement personnel, corrections officers, and staff of state agencies. See id.
16. See id. at 22-26.
17. See id. at 3.
18. See id. at 3-4.
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Having identified these needs, the Task Force issued a report
recommending significant changes to the statute governing the
transfer of juveniles to adult court.' The Task Force also recommended the creation of a blended sentencing option, named by
the Task Force as the Serious Youthful Offender ° and renamed by
the legislature the Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile ("EJJ") 2 The
substantive recommendations submitted to the 1994 Legislature by
the Task Force were adopted almost in their entirety.22 This article
examines: (1) the relevant changes to the transfer process; (2) the
creation of the EJJ classification; and (3) the impact of these
changes on the juvenile system from the perspective of a prosecutor.
II. THE 1994
A.

STATUTORY CHANGES: CERTIFICATION AND

EJ

Overview

The changes in the provisions to transfer juveniles to adult
court ("certification") and the creation of the blended jurisdiction
category of juvenile offender are entwined. Both grew from a desire to give the juvenile court tools to address the serious juvenile
offender while retaining the court's
ability to rehabilitate those ju23
treatment.
to
amenable
veniles
Prior to the 1994 changes to the certification statute, juveniles
between the ages of fourteen and seventeen could be certified to
adult court for any crime. 24 The prosecutor, however, was required
LO prove by clear an' convinicing evidence ..hat die child was not
suitable for treatment or that public safety would not be served by
retention in the juvenile system.25 Although the statute set forth
various primafacie criteria for certification of sixteen and seventeen
accused
year olds
of specific
maind
wth
te
• 26offenses, the burden of proof remained with the prosecution. The Juvenile Court Rules set forth
eleven factors for the court to consider when examining the issue
19. See id. In Minnesota, this process is now referred to as certification to
stand trial as an adult, or simply "certification." See MINN. STAT. § 260.125 (1998).
20. See ADViSORyTASK FORcE, supra note 3, at 31-37.
21. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1998).
22. See id. §§ 260.125 & .126; see also Feld, supranote 1, at 967.
23. See ADvisoRYTASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 3-4.
24. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125, subd. 1 (1992).
25. See id. § 260.125, subd. 2 (1992).
26. See id. § 260.125, subd. 3 (1992).
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of certification.
The subjectivity of these factors was of concern to the Task
Force.28 Even with the rise in juvenile crime, the 1992 statistics
showed that the majority of juveniles certified to adult court were
accused of committing property offenses.'
Specifically, the Task
Force report notes that in 1992, fifty-two percent of juveniles sentenced in adult court were property offenders, thirty-five percent
were person offenders and thirteen percent had committed other
crimes. ° The Task Force recommended that this dispositional option be reserved for those 3few offenders who have shown that they
'
pose a risk to public safety.
For these offenders, the Task Force recommended simplifying
the certification process, as well as clearly making public safety the

27. See MINN. R.JUv. P. 32.05, subd. 2 (1992). The eleven factors set forth in
Rule 32 of the Minnesota Rules ofJuvenile Procedure were:
(1) the seriousness of the offense in terms of community prosecution;
(2) the circumstances surrounding the offense;
(3) whether the offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner;
(4) whether the offense was directed against persons or property, the
greater weight being given to an offense against persons, especially if personal injury resulted;
(5) the reasonably foreseeable consequences of the act;

(6) the absence of adequate protective and security facilities available to
the juvenile treatment system;
(7) the sophistication and maturity of the child as determined by consideration of the child's home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living;
(8) the record and previous history of the child;
(9) whether the child acted with particular cruelty or disregard for the
life or safety of another;
(10) whether the offense involved a high degree of sophistication or
planning by the child; and
(11) whether there is sufficient time available before the child reaches
age nineteen to provide appropriate treatment and control.
Id.
28.
8-9.
29.
30.
that in

See ADVISORY TASK FORCE, supranote 3, at 27; see also Feld, supra note 1, at

See ADVISORY TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 25.
See id. These figures are consistent with national statistics, which show
1992 nonviolent offenders comprised 66 percent of all juveniles waived to
adult court. See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, supra note 2, at 42.
31. See ADvISORY TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 27.
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central issue in any certification proceeding.3 2 Both of these recommendations were adopted by the 1994 Legislature.3 3 The certification statute was amended to limit certification to felony offenses,
to create presumptive and non-presumptive certification procedures, and to articulate clearly that public safety is the focus of any
certification proceeding."
Under the statute as amended, certification is presumed for
juveniles sixteen or seventeen years old (at the time of the offense)
who are charged with committing an offense for which the sentencing guidelines presume an executed prison sentence or an offense
involving the use of a firearm. 5 In these presumptive cases, the
burden of proof rests with the child to establish by clear and convincing evidence that public safety is served by retention in the juvenile system.-6 In all other cases the burden of proof remains with
the state to prove that transfer of the child to adult court serves
public safety.37 The public safety factors set forth in the certification statute are:
(1) the seriousness of the alleged offense in terms of
community protection, including the existence of any aggravating factors recognized by the sentencing guidelines,
the use of a firearm, and the impact on any victim;
(2) the culpability of the child in committing the alleged
offense, including the level of the child's participation in
planning and carrying out the offense and the existence
of any mitigating factors recognized by the sentencing
guidelines;
(3) the child's prior record of delinquency;
(4) the child's prior programming history, including the
child's past willingness to participate meaningfully in
available programming;
(5) the adequacy of the punishment or programming
available in the juvenile justice system; and

32.
33.
34.
35.

See id. at 26-30.
See 1994 Minn. Laws 576 (amending MINN. STAT. § 260.125).
See 1994 Minn. Laws 576.
See MINN. STAT. § 260.125, subd. 2a (1998).

36.
37.

See id.
See id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss4/4

6

Santelmann and Lillesand:
Jurisdiction Juveniles
in Minnesota: a Prosecutor'S Pers
1309
1999]
EJJ- AExtended
PROSECUTOR'S
PERSPECTIVE

(6) the dispositional options available for the child.n
In considering each of these factors, the court is required to
give greater weight to the seriousness of the alleged offense and to
the child's prior programming history than to the other four factors. " While creating changes intended to make certification of serious offenders more certain, the Task Force and legislature also
created a mechanism by which serious juvenile offenders could be
given "one last chance at success in the juvenile system, with the
threat of adult sanctions as an incentive not to reoffend." 4° This
"one last chance" category was dubbed Extended Juvenile Jurisdiction by the legislature. Those falling within the category have become known as Extended Jurisdiction Juveniles.
The same public safety factors set forth in the certification
provisions are to be used by courts in making decisions regarding
EJJ designation. 4' The intention of the Task Force, and presumably
the legislature, in requiring evidence on each of the public safety
S 41
factors was to make the proceedings as objective as possible.
Whether this goal has been accomplished with respect to EJJ proceedings will be discussed below.
B. Eff"Expansion of theJuvenile Court's SentencingAuthority
A growing trend in the area ofjuvenile justice is the expansion
of the juvenile court's disposition and sentencing options. As part
of the trend to focus on public safety concerns as well as rehabilitation of the juvenile, courts nationally are experimenting with new

MiNN. STAT. § 260.125, subd. 2b (1998).

The Task Force recommenda-

tions listed five of these six factors. See ADVISORY

38.

TASK FORcE, supra note 3, at 27.

The legislature added the fifth factor, adequacy of punishment or programming
available in the juvenile system. See 1994 Minn. Laws 576.
39. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125, subd. 2b.
40. See ADVISORY TASKFORCE, supranote 3, at 5.
41. See id. The Task Force recommended only two paths to designation as a

Serious Youthful Offender: from a failed certification hearing or by prosecutor
designation. See id. The designation resulting from a failed certification hearing
requires consideration of the public safety factors because the certification process
requires the weighing of these factors. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125, subd. 2. The
legislature, in adopting the Extended Jurisdiction Statute, specifically required the
consideration of the six public safety factors set forth in the certification statute.
See id. § 260.126, subd. 2.
42. See ADvIsORY TASKFORcE, supra note 3, at 27.
43. SeeTORBETETAL., supra note 1, at 11.
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Shifts in these sentencing

(1) the imposition of 'blended sentences' that mix both
adult and juvenile sanctions; (2) the imposition of mandatory minimum sentences for certain types of offenders or
offense categories; and (3) the extension of juvenile court
jurisdiction for dispositional purposes beyond the age of
majority, lengthening the time that a juvenile is held accountable in juvenile court.5
Minnesota's EJJ statute includes two of these three practices by
extending the expiration of the juvenile court's jurisdiction to the
child's twenty-first birthday. 46 The statute further provides for the
imposition of both a juvenile disposition and a stayed adult sentence. 47 Enacted in 1994, and effectiveJanuary 1, 1995, the statute
44. See id.
45. Id. The authors identify five basic models of blended sentencing options.
See id. These models are described as:
(1) the "juvenile exclusive blend" in which the juvenile court imposes either ajuvenile or adult sanction;
(2) the "juvenile inclusive blend" in which the juvenile court simultaneously imposes both a juvenile and an adult sentence, with the adult sentence being suspended pending violation and revocation;
(3) the "juvenile contiguous" blend in which the juvenile court imposes
a juvenile sanction that may remain in force beyond the age of its extended jurisdiction;
(4) the "criminl eycluive bend" in NThch the criminal court imposes
either ajuvenile or an adult sanction; and
(5) the "criminal inclusive blend" in which the criminal court imposes
both ajuvenile and adult sanction and suspends the adult sentence pending a violation or reoffense.
See id. at 11-14. Minnesota's E J statute is an example of the "juvenile inclusive
blend" model. See id. at 12.
46. See MINN. STAT. § 260.181, subd. 4(b) (1998). The majority of Task Force
members recommended extension of the juvenile court's jurisdiction to age 23.
See ADVIsORy TASK FORCE, supra note 3, at 33. A minority of the members felt jurisdiction should extend only to age 21. See id. The report identifies a number of
concerns expressed ifjurisdiction was extended to age 23. See id. These concerns
included: too long an exposure for juveniles to reoffend; overwhelming the adult
criminal justice system if the juveniles were to reoffend and have their adult sentences executed; and making certification to adult court more difficult. See id. Ultimately, the legislature chose to extend juvenile courtjurisdiction to age 21 rather
than 23. See MINN. STAT. § 260.181, subd. 4(b).
47. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126 (1998).
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expanded the dispositional options for the serious, violent or repeat juvenile offender.48
The Task Force designed the EJJ designation to provide "a
more graduated juvenile justice system based on age and offense
with a new transitional component between the juvenile and adult
systems. "49 The purpose of the designation was to give the public
the best of both systems. 50 The juvenile court would retain access to
juvenile programming and would have the availability of adult sanctions if the programming was not successful. 51 Because adult sanctions can be imposed if the juvenile is found to have violated the
terms of the juvenile probation, the statute gives the child the right
to trial byjury. 2 In Minnesota, all juveniles charged with a criminal
offense are also entitled to court-appointed counsel.53 Thus, in EJJ
proceedings: the child is granted the adult rights of representation
and jury trial, the dispositional options of the juvenile system are
retained, and the sentencing authority of the juvenile court is expanded.
The statute provides that the EJJ designation is limited tojuveniles fourteen to seventeen years old who have committed a felonylevel offense.54 There are four paths to an EJJ designation:
(1) Prosecution Designation: prosecutors may designate
as Ejj any 16- or 17-year-old charged with committing an
offense with a firearm or an offense for which the sentencing guidelines presume an executed prison term. 55
(2) Mandatory Court Designation: the juvenile court
must designate as EJJ any 16- or 17-year-old charged with
committing an offense with a firearm or an offense for
which the sentencing guidelines presume an executed
prison term if the state's motion for certification is denied. 6
(3) Discretionary Court Designation Following Certifica48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
3(a).

See id. § 260.126, subd. 4.
supranote 3, at 32.
See id. at 33.
See id. at 33-34.
See MINN. STAT. § 260.126, subd. 3 (1998).
See MINN. R.Juv. P. 3.02.
See MINN. STAT. § 260.126, subd. 1 (1998).
Id. § 260.126, subd. 1(2); MINN. R.Juv. P. 19.01, subd. 3(b).
MINN. STAT. § 260.126, subd. 1(2) (1998); MINN. R. Juv. P. 19.01, subd.

ADVISORY TASK FORCE,
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tion Motion: a juvenile 14 to 17 charged with a felony
when, following a certification hearing,57the court determines the designation to be appropriate.
(4) Discretionary Court Designation Following EM] Motion: a juvenile 14 to 17 charged with a felony when, following an EJJ motion and hearing, the court determines
the designation to be appropriate.
In reaching its decision regarding EJ designation, the juvenile
court must weigh the same six public safety factors set forth in the
certification statute.'5 Because the statute does not specify if or how
these factors are to be weighed differently in Ejj proceedings, in
many cases juvenile courts must subjectively determine whether a
child should be certified as an adult or designated Ejj. This result
appears to be at cross-purposes with the Task Force's goal of limiting the subjectivity of the juvenile court through the creation of the
public safety factors. Nevertheless, the creation of the ED designation has provided more options in treating the serious juvenile offender and from this standpoint it has been beneficial.
The probation violation provisions of the EJJ statute also warrant comment. The statute sets forth procedures for the revocation
of juvenile probation and imposition of the adult sentence. The
juvenile is entitled to notice and a hearing on the alleged violations.' ° As in adult court, a violation must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.6 ' If the court finds reasons exist to revoke the
stay of execution of the adult sentence, the court is required to
treat the offender as an adult.62 The court retains the option of
executing the stayed adult sentence or again staying execution of
the sentence on specified conditions.63 However, in presumptive
EJJ cases, cases where the juvenile has committed an offense using
a firearm or for which the sentencing guidelines presume an executed prison term, if the judge does not execute the stayed sentence he or she must make written findings. 64 The findings must

57.

MINN.

STAT.

§ 260.126, subd. 1(1) (1998); MINN. R.Juv. P. 19.01, subd. 4.

58.

MINN.

STAT.

§ 260.126, subd. 1(3) (1998); MINN. R.Juv. P. 19.01, subd. 4.

59.

See MINN.

60.

See id. § 260.126, subd. 5 (1998).

61.

See id. § 260.126, subd. 2.

62.

See id. § 260.126, subd. 5.

63.
64.

See id.
See id.

STAT.

§ 260.126, subd. 2 (1998).
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set forth the mitigating factors thatjustify continuing the stay. '5
Because the statute took effect on January 1, 1995,66 there have
not yet been large numbers of juveniles designated ED. In 1995,
195 juveniles were designated as EJJ."' This number rose to 240juveniles in 1996, and fell to 220juveniles in 1997.6 As many of these
offenders were sent to placements for a year to eighteen months,
data on probation violations are limited. For example, whether the
path to Ejj designation effects the frequency or outcome of probation violations remains to be seen.
The Task Force recommended that the court treat probation
violations of ED offenders in the same manner as adults who had
committed a new offense or violated the terms of probation, including execution of the stayed adult sentence. 69 The intent is
clear: 'Juveniles will know there is certainty of punishment, com70
bined with an opportunity to be successful in the juvenile system."
Although the intent of the Task Force is clear; whether certainty of
punishment occurs will depend upon the decisions of our juvenile
judges.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE 1994 STATUTORY CHANGES
As a result of the 1994 statutory changes, certification ofjuveniles for anything less than a felony offense is no longer allowed in
Minnesota.7 1 EJ designation is also limited to felony cases. 72 Thus,
by its own terms, the effect of the statutory changes has been to retain all nonfelony cases within juvenile court. A review of the statistical data available on ElM offenders, as well as an examination of
the probation revocation proceedings, reveals that the impact of
the statutory changes has been significant.

65. See id.
66. See 1994 Minn. Laws 576.
67. See Letter from Sharon Krmpotich, Research and Planning, Supreme
Court of Minn., to Jim Hayes, Juvenile Division Director of the Ramsey County
Community Corrections Department (undated) (on file with the William Mitchell
Law Review).
68. See id.
69. See ADVISORY TASK FORCE, supranote 3, at 34.
70. Id.
71. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125, subd. 1 (1998).
72. See id. § 260.126, subd. 1 (1998).
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Eff. StatisticalData

Although the
73 law provides four ways in which ajuvenile may be74
designated EJ, most cases fall within clause two of the EJJ statute.74
Court designation under clause two of the statute accounts for
69.7% of all EJJ cases.75 Of the remaining cases, 14.4% followed a
failed certification motion,76 and only 15.9% of juveniles were des-

ignated EJJ through a prosecutor's filing a motion to designate an
offender EM. 77
There does not appear to be statewide data available that
shows how many of the court designated EJJ cases were the result of
plea agreements. However, it is important to note that a child who
fits the criteria of clause two of the EJJ statute also meets the criteria for presumptive certification. 8 It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the majority of these "clause two" EJJ cases are the result
of a negotiated plea. Internal data from the Ramsey County Attorney's Office show that certification motions were brought in twentysix of the thirty-four cases designated as EJJ in 1997. 79 In 1998, certification motions were brought in eighteen out of the twenty cases
eventually designated as EJJ.80 In the author's experience, in the
majority of these cases, the EJJ designation was the result of a negotiated settlement.
See id. §§ 260.125, subd. 5 & .126, subd. 1(2) & 5.
See MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, 1996 EXTENDED JURISDICTION JUVENILE
CASES DISPOSITION STATUS-TO-DATE 12 (Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter EXTENDED

73.
74.

(EMj)
JURISDICTION]. According to data provided by the Minnesota Supreme Court, Research and Technology Office, 195 cases were disposed of as Ell in Minnesota in
1996. See id. Of these 195 cases, 28 cases were designated EM as a result of a denied certification motion, 136 met the presumptive criteria for EMJ designation
under clause two of the statute, and 31 cases were designated EJJ following a hearing on prosecutors motions. See id. Minnesota Statutes section 260.126, subd.
1(2), provides for designation when the child is 16 or 17 years old at the time of
the alleged offense; the child is alleged to have committed an offense for which
the sentencing guidelines and applicable statutes presume a commitment to
prison or to have committed any felony in which the child allegedly used a firearm; and the prosecutor designated in the delinquency petition that the proceeding is an extended jurisdiction juvenile prosecution. See MINN. STAT. § 260.126,
subd. 1 (2).
75. See EXTENDEDJURISDICTION, supra note 74, at 9-10.
76. See id. at 8.
77. See id. at 11.
78. See MINN. STAT. §§ 260.125, subd. 2a & .126, subd. 1 (2).
79. See Ramsey County Attorney's Office Certification/EM statistics for 1998
(on file with the William Mitchell Law Review).
80. See id.
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It is also not surprising that very few cases were designated EJJ
as a result of a motion for designation brought by the prosecutor.
From a prosecutor's perspective, it is often preferable to bring a
motion for certification, even in those cases where the statute
would allow for automatic EJJ designation. The certification motion provides an opportunity to investigate the child's delinquency
history and psychological profile. In Ramsey County it is the policy
that for every motion for certification a probation officer's report
and a psychological evaluation will be done. The information contained in these reports is critical when making a decision to litigate
the issue of certification or to agree to another disposition. In addition, the Minnesota Juvenile Rules of Procedure provide a disincentive for a prosecutor to designate a juvenile as EJJ.8 The Rules
require a jury trial to be commenced within thirty days of the EJJ
designation if the child is in custody. 2 In non-custody cases the
time for trial is extended to sixty days. 83 Bringing a certification
motion means that the case is set for a certification hearing within
thirty to sixty days. This additional time gives prosecutors, defense
counsel and the court an opportunity to evaluate the juvenile to determine whether an EJJ designation would be appropriate. It also
gives the parties time to prepare for trial, which is advantageous to
all concerned.
As intended by the Task Force, the statutory changes also appear to have limited certification and EJJ designation to the more
serious, person-related offenses. 84 All ten judicial districts within
the state use four categories in classifying EJJ offenders: personrelated offenses, property-related offenses, drug-related offenses,
and "other" offenses. 85
Data show that in 1996, 50.9% of certified juveniles 816and sixtyfour percent of EJJ offenders"' were charged with committing a
person-related offense. In 1997, over fifty-nine percent of EJJ of81.

See MINN. R.Juv. P. 19.07.

82. See MINN. R.Juv. P. 13.02, subd. 1.
83. See MINN. R.Juv. P. 13.02, subd. 2.
84. See Letter from Sharon Krmpotich, supra note 67.
85. See id. All offenses that can not be labeled person-related, propertyrelated, or drug-related are considered "other" offenses. See id.
86. See Letter from Sharon Krmpotich, The Supreme Court of Minnesota, Research and Planning, to Kari Lillesand, Juvenile Law Clerk, Ramsey County Attorney's Office (undated) (on file with the William Mitchell Law Review).
87. See MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF EJJ AND
CERTIFICATION DATA, THE 3RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON YOUTH AND CRIME 8 (Mar.
19, 1997) [hereinafter STATISTICAL OVERVIEW].
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fenders were charged with committing a person-related offense.8
When viewing all ten judicial districts collectively, seventy percent
of all juveniles designated as EJl in 1996 were charged with assault,
robbery, or burglary.89 Forty-six percent of those adjudicated had
no prior criminal history; while forty-three percent had one to
three prior felonies; and eleven percent had four or more prior
felonies.90
Although the cumulative statewide figures show a majority of
EJl offenders have been accused of person-related offenses, there is
significant disparity amongst the counties. 9' The Ninth Judicial District consists of seventeen counties comprising the northwest quarter of the state. 2 In the Ninth District, property offenders represented seventy-three percent of all juveniles designated Eli in
1997. 93 For this same year, in the Fourth Judicial District (Hennepin County) property offenders represented only 10.6% of the Eli
cases, while sixty-nine percent involved crimes against persons.9 4 In
the Second Judicial District (Ramsey County) property offenders
accounted for 3.4% of the Ell cases and person-related offenses accounted for 86.2% of the cases. 95 A comparison of the figures in
the Ninth Judicial District to those for the Second District becomes
even more interesting in light of the number of EJ cases in each
District.
In 1997, the Ninth District designated thirty-seven juveniles as
99
Eli
For this same year, the Second District designated twentynine juveniles as El.9 7 Thus, the Ninth District had more Eli offenders than the Second District, and the majority of these offenders were accused of committing property crimes.98 It would be un88.

See Letter from Sharon Krmpotich, supra note 86.
See STATISTICAL OVERVIEW, supranote 87, at 9.
90. See id. at 10. In addition, the figures show that 42.0% were White, 35%
African American, 8.0% Hispanic, 8% American Indian, and 7.0% were Asian. See
id.
91. See MINNESOTA PLANNING, JUDGING BY THE DATA: OFFENDERS IN
MINNESOTA'SJUVENILE COURTS 6 (June 1998).
92. See id. The seventeen counties are: Aitkin, Beltrami, Cass, Clearwater,
Crow Wing, Hubbard, Itasca, Kittson, Koochiching, Lake of the Woods,
Mahnomen, Marshall, Norman, Pennington, Polk, Red Lake, and Roseau. See id.
93. See Letter from Sharon Krmpotich, supra note 67.
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.

89.
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fair to draw any conclusions about these figures without knowing
the types of cases that resulted in certification as compared to EJJ,
the facts of each case, and the histories of the juveniles involved.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that in the Ninth District a significant
number of property offenders are being designated as EJJ, while in
the Second District, a much more urban district, almost all of the
EJJ cases involve person-related offenses. The variance amongst the
judicial districts in EM designations by offense category is depicted
in the chart appearing in Appendix I.
The demographics of EJ offenders are also interesting. Ejj offenders are primarily males over the age of fifteen." Data provided
by the Minnesota Supreme Court and Minnesota Department of
Corrections show that in 1996, 94.5% of Extended Jurisdiction Juveniles were male, and 5.5% were female. 1°° Furthermore, although
the minimum age for EM designation is fourteen, the majority of
offenders are sixteen or seventeen years old at the time they commit the offense for which they are designated an EJJ. 0' In fact, only
two percent of the offenders were fourteen and 12.9% fifteen years
old at the time they committed the offense for which they were designated EMi.' 02 Over twenty-five percent of the EM offenders were
sixteen years old at the time of the offense and 46.5% were seventeen years old.'03
The age data is interesting in light of a recent legislative proposal made to the Minnesota County Attorneys Association
("MCAA") to lower to twelve the age at which a juvenile could be
designated EJJ.' 04 The need for this amendment to the statute is
unclear. Furthermore, it is sobering to contemplate imposing a
stayed adult prison sentence on a twelve-year-old child. While the
likelihood of passage of such legislation is uncertain, it is further
evidence of the trend described at the outset of this article-to shift
the focus in juvenile court from rehabilitation to public safety.
99. See id.
100. See STAisTIcAL OvERVIEw, supra note 87, at 2.
101. See id. at 2.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id. The legislation as discussed would have allowed prosecutors to designate as EJJ juveniles 12 to 15 years of age alleged to have used a firearm in the
commission of any of the offenses set forth in Minnesota Statutes section 609.11,
subd. 9. See id. It also would have allowed prosecutors to move to designate as EJJ
any juvenile 12 to 13 years old alleged to have committed any of the offenses listed
in Minnesota Statutes section 609.11, subd. 9. See id.
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A more specific examination of the data from Hennepin and
Ramsey counties is also instructive. Minnesota remains one of the
fastest-growing states in the Northeast and Midwest, and ranks
twentieth nationally in total population size. 10 5 Hennepin and
Ramsey Counties °6 constitute 33.22% of the state's population, and
contain the state's two largest cities, Minneapolis and St. Paul.'0 7 An
examination of ED data in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties shows
that particularly in these two counties an overwhelming number of
juveniles are designated EJJ for serious, person-related offenses.108
105. See Minnesota Planning, Minnesota Population Growth Continues to Slow
(Dec. 31, 1998) (visited Sept. 27, 1999) <http://www.mnplan.state.mn.us/press
/migrate98.html>.
The state of Minnesota is comprised of 87 counties. See
MINNESOTA PLANNING, supra note 91, at 6. Over one million individuals ages 10 to
24 reside in Minnesota. See U.S. Census Bureau, State PopulationProjections (visited
Sept. 30, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/population/www/projections/stproj
.html>. The U.S. Bureau of the Census projects that by the year 2000 the number
of individuals between 10 and 24 will continue to slowly rise along with the rest of
the state's population. See id. The Bureau's projections for Hennepin County and
Ramsey County reflect that approximately 325,000 individuals ages 10 to 24 will
reside within one of these counties by the year 2000. See id.
The focus of the demographic information cited in this article will be tailored around discussion of the Second and Fourth Judicial Districts, Ramsey
County and Hennepin County respectively, because many of those designated EJJ
are dispositioned in one of these counties. See EXTENDEDJURISDICTION, supra note
74, at 12. A greater representative sample can be ascertained by using these two
counties in part due to the fact in 1996, 46 counties did not even have one juvenile
designated as ED, and 33 counties had five or less juveniles designated as EJJ. See
id. According to the Minnesota Planning Department, Minnesota's population on
July 1, 1998 was 4,725,419, an increase of 38,000 people in one year. See Minnesota Planning, MinnesotaPopulation Growth Continues to Slow, supra.
106. Ramsey County is the only county in the Second Judicial District. See
MINNESOTA PLANNING, JUDGING BY THE DATA: OFFENDERS IN MINNESOTA'S JUVENILE

COURTS 6 (June 1998),
available at <http://www.mnplan.state.mn.us/
press/juvenile.html>. Together, Hennepin County and Ramsey County account
for over 1.5 million of the state's total population. See Minnesota Planning, County
Estimates (visited Sept. 27, 1999) <http://www.mnplan.state.mn.us/demography/
demog_3b.html>. Ramsey County's population constitutes slightly over 10% of
the state's total population. See id. Ramsey County has designated 123juveniles as
EJJ since the evolution of the EJJ statute.

See generally RAMSEY COUNTYJUVENILE

PROBATION AND PAROLE: EXTENDEDJURISDICTIONJUVENILE SUMMARY

(Jan. 1, 1995

to

Nov. 2, 1998) [hereinafter RAMSEY COUNTYJUVENILE PROBATION SUMMARY] (on file

with authors).
107. See Minnesota Planning, County Estimates, supra note 106.
108. See Letter from Sharon Krmpotich, supra note 67. Together, Hennepin
and Ramsey counties comprise 33.22% of the state's population and contain the
two largest cities (Minneapolis and St. Paul) within the state. See Minnesota Planning, County Estimates, supra note 106. In Hennepin County 69.4% of Ell offend-
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Hennepin County is the most populous county in the state of
Minnesota.' 9 More than thirty percent of the state's EJJ dispositions take place in Hennepin County." ° As in the statewide data,
male offenders dramatically outnumber female offenders."'
Ninety-six percent of all offenders are male."2 Over thirty percent
of offenders had no prior record of past adjudications, 17.7% had
been convicted of misdemeanor level offenses, and 27.8% had
been convicted of one felony in the past. ' 1 3 The deviation in these
figures from the statewide figures is marginal; however, all Hennepin County offenders were designated EJJ prior to being convicted
of more than three felonies. 4 In Hennepin County more than
50.5% of all EJ offenders never had a prior delinquency out-ofhome placement, and 81.7% had been placed out of the home two
or fewer times as a result of delinquency proceedings.'
Ramsey County mirrors the statewide data with respect to gender and closely resembles the statewide average with respect to the
age of offender at the time of filing the petition. The vast majority,
ninety-six percent, of offenders are male and eighty percent are
over the age of sixteen." 6 Only four percent of Ramsey County's
designated Ejj offenders were accused of property or drug-related
offenses." 7 An overwhelming ninety-six percent are designated ED
for person-related offenses."8 This value is significantly higher than
the statewide figure (59.1%) for individuals designated EJJ as a result of person-related offenses." 9 This data indicates that, especially
in Hennepin and Ramsey Counties, the EM designation is being
used to give the serious and violent juvenile offender one last
chance.
ers and 86.2% in Ramsey County were charged with person offenses based on data
available for 1997. See Letter from Sharon Krmpotich, supra note 67.
109. See Minnesota Planning, County Estimates, supra note 106.
110. See Letter from Marcy Podkopacz, Director of Research, State of Minnesota, to Kathryn Santelmann, Assistant Director, Prosecution Division-Juvenile Section, Ramsey County Attorney's Office (Jan. 1, 1999) (on file with the William
Mitchell Law Review).
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See RAMsEY COUNTYJUVENILE PROBATION SUMMARY, supranote 106.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
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Based upon all of the above data, it also appears that the majority of EJJ offenders are juveniles who meet the criteria for presumptive certification to adult court. The vast majority of EJJ offenders are at least sixteen years old and relatively few have
previously committed four or more felonies.2 ° The designation
appears equally divided between those juveniles who have no felony
history and those who have previously committed one to three
felonies.'
That these offenders are being given the opportunity
for treatment within the juvenile system appears consistent with the
goals of the statute as designed by the Task Force.
B. ProbationViolation Data
Another measure of the effectiveness of the Ejj statute is the
frequency and outcome of probation violation proceedings. When
ajuvenile offender is designated as ED, both ajuvenile disposition
and an adult criminal sentence are imposed.'2 Execution of the
adult sentence is stayed pending satisfactory completion of the juvenile disposition.
If the child violates the terms of his or her juvenile sentence, the statute provides for the revocation of the offender's juvenile status. 24 If a court determines revocation is
warranted, the judge
must determine whether to execute the stayed
25
adult sentence.
Upon revocation, the juvenile judge may order any of the
adult sanctions authorized by Minnesota Statutes section 609.14,
subd. 3126 However, if the juvenile was convicted of an offense for
which the Sentencing Guidelines presume an executed prison sentence, the court is required to execute the previously imposed sentence unless the judge makes written finding regarding the mitigating factors that justify continuing the stay. 27 One issue that has
arisen a number of times in Ramsey County is whether or not the
"mitigating factors" must be ones that are recognized by the Sentencing Guidelines. We are unaware of any appellate decisions on
this issue and the statute does not explain what is meant by this
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See id.; see also Letter from Marcy Podkopacz, supra note 110.
See Letter from Marcy Podkopacz, supra note 110.
See MINN. STAT. § 260.126, subd. 4 (1998).
See id.
See MINN. STAT. § 260.126, subd. 5 (1998); see also MINN.R. Juv. P. 19.
See MINN.STAT. § 260.126, subd. 5.
See id.
See id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol25/iss4/4

18

Santelmann and Lillesand: Extended Jurisdiction Juveniles in Minnesota: a Prosecutor'S Pers

1999]

EJJ - A PROSECUTOR'S PERSPECTIVE

term.
The Research and Technology Office of the Minnesota Supreme Court has tracked the dispositions and status of all offenders
designated as ED in 1996.128 According to this data, 195 juveniles
were designated ED in that year.12 Of those designated EJJ, twentyeight were the result of failed certification motions under clause
one of the statute," 136 were court designated under clause two of
the statute, 3 1 and thirty-one were the result of a prosecutor's mo1-32
tion for EJ designation under clause three of the statute.
Statewide probation violation data on these 1996 offenders was
tabulated through December 31, 1998. These data show that there
have been forty-three juveniles (22.1%) whose E] probation has
been revoked.'33 Of these, seventeen (39.5%) have had their prison
An almost equal number, twenty-one
sentences executed.1'
(48.8%), have been sentenced to local jails or workhouses. 35 The
specific data for Hennepin and Ramsey Counties show a similar dibeen exevision of revoked offenders whose prison sentences have
36
jail.
county
to
sent
been
have
who
cuted versus those
In Hennepin County, sixty-seven of the 170 designated EJ
fromJanuary 1, 1995 to December 31, 1996 have had theirjuvenile
dispositions revoked, and their adult sentence executed due to
noncompliance with the conditions ofjuvenile probation.137 Eleven
offenders had their adult sentences executed based on a failure to
comply with the conditions of sexual offender or chemical dependency treatment."8 Of these, five offenders were sent to prison,
and the remaining six offenders were sent to the workhouse. 9
Thirty-nine offenders violated the conditions of juvenile probation," resulting in twenty-two individuals ordered to prison, and

See generally EXTENDEDJURISDICrION, supra note 74.
See id. at 7.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 12.
See id.
See id.
See Letter from Marcy Podkopacz, supra note 110;" see also RAMSEY COUNTY
JUVENILE PROBATION SUMMARY, supra note 106.
137. See Letter from Marcy Podkopacz, supra note 110.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
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seventeen ordered to the workhouse. 141 Sixteen offenders had their
juvenile probation revoked due to the commission and subsequent
conviction of a new offense. 4 2 Exactly half of these offenders were
sentenced to prison, and half were ordered to the workhouse.'4 3 In
addition, no matter what the bases of the revocation, there is virtually an equal number of offenders who have been sentenced to
prison, and who have been sentenced to the workhouse.'"
In Ramsey County, of the thirty-three offenders who have had
their juvenile disposition revoked, ten offenders had nonpresumptive adult stayed sentences, and the remaining twentythree offenders had presumptive adult stayed sentences. 45 Of the
non-presumptive group, eight were sentenced to jail and probation, one was sentenced to prison, and one was placed under a civil
commitment as a sex offender upon completion of his adult prison
sentence. 1 Of the presumptive group, eleven of the offenders
were ordered to prison whereas the47 other twelve offenders were
sent to jail and placed on probation.

The most frequent bases for the revocation proceedings in
Ramsey County was an inability of the offenders to successfully
abide by the conditions ofjuvenile probation or the commission of
a new criminal offense. A closer look at these offenders reveals that
fifty-eight percent failed the conditions of probation, and forty-two
percent had committed a new offense.'48
The statewide probation violation data has also been calculated based on which clause the juvenile was designated EJJ.' 4 9
There is some variance in the outcomes using this distinguishing
characteristic. For example, for those juveniles designated EJJ un141. See id.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
145. See Memorandum from Jim Hayes, Juvenile Division Director of the Ramsey County Community Corrections Department, to Harley Nelson (Feb. 18, 1999)
(on file with the William Mitchell Law Review). The data provided for Ramsey
County includes all offenders designated EJJ from January 1, 1995 through December 31, 1998. During this period, 121 juveniles were designated EJJ.
146. See Electronic Mail Message from Jim Hayes, Juvenile Division Director of
the Ramsey County Community Corrections Department, to Kari Lillesand, Juvenile Law Clerk, Ramsey County Attorney's Office (Mar. 17, 1999) (on file with the
William Mitchell Law Review).
147. See id.
148. See Electronic Mail Message from Hayes, supra note 146.
149.

See EXTENDEDJURISDICrION, supranote 74, at 8.
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der clause one of the statute, five were found to have violated their
ED probation. However, only one of these five juveniles was sent to
prison. Yet half of the juveniles designated EJJ under clauses two
and three of the statute were sent to prison upon
a finding that
15
'
probation.
EJJ
their
of
terms
the
violated
had
they
This outcome is somewhat surprising given that the "clause
one" offenders were designated EJJ as a result of a failed certification motion. One would assume that juveniles in this category
would be older and have committed more serious offenses. This
outcome may be able to be explained by virtue of the small sample
size (only five cases) . However, this result points to the need for
future studies to track such variables as offense type, age, prior offense history and the basis for revocation to determine the fairness
of probation violation proceedings.
Overall, the data show that lower courts are exercising significant discretion when deciding whether to execute the stayed adult
sentence. This appears consistent with the Task Force's recommendation to treat EJJ probation violations in the same manner as
adult violation proceedings.153 However, these results are arguably
inconsistent with the Task Force's intention to ensure "certainty of
punishment" after an offender fails to take advantage of the one
last chance ofjuvenile treatment.
IV. CASELAW

An examination of Minnesota's EJJ statute would not be complete without a discussion of the cases that have emerged since its
passage in 1994. However, as of the writing of this article, the
number of either published or unpublished appellate decisions is
limited. Only two opinions address the constitutionality of the EJJ
statute. 54 Other decisions
seem to focus primarily on sufficiency of
55
the evidence issues.

With regard to the two constitutional cases, in neither has the
150. See id. at 7-11. Supreme Court data show that of the 28 "clause one" EI
cases, five juveniles (17.9%) have had their probation revoked. See id. Of the 136
"clause two" cases, 27juveniles (19.9%) have had their probation revoked, and of
the 31 "clause three" cases, 11 juveniles (35.5%) have had their probation revoked, as of December 31, 1998. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id. at 8.
153. SeeADvisoRyTASKFORcE, supranote 3, at 34.
154. See infra notes 157-170 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 172-195 and accompanying text.
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Minnesota Court of Appeals sustained the challenge. The first
case, In re Welfare of L.JS &J T.K.,"' the court of appeals addressed
the issues of separation of powers, vagueness, equal protection and
due process. 57 The State charged J.T.K by petition with making
terroristic threats and committing first and second degree assault.' 5
He was sixteen years old when he allegedly committed these offenses.1 59 The prosecutor's designation of J.T.K. was automatic because the sentencing guidelines presumed an executed prison sentence.'1 ° J.T.K. argued that the language of the statute allowing
prosecutors to designate an offender an EJJ was unconstitutionally
vague and violated due process.16 ' The court of appeals summarily
rejected both of these arguments, holding that the statutory criteria
for EIJ designation are very specific
and not conducive to arbitrary
6
or discriminatory enforcement.1 1
J.T.K. also challenged, on the basis of the separation of powers
doctrine, the provision of the statute allowing prosecutors to designate ajuvenile ED without a hearing on the matter.6 3 The juvenile
asserted that the EJ designation is essentially a sentencing determination.'4 Thus, J.T.K. argued, the court should retain the exclusive authority to designate any juvenile as an EJJ offender.6 5 The
State argued that the designation should be characterized
as a
66
charging decision rather than a sentencing determination. 1
In rejectingJ.T.K.'s argument, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
noted the unique nature of juvenile proceedings. 167 The court also
cited to various jurisdictions in which, based on age and offense,
legislators have given prosecutors the authority to charge juveniles
as adults.1' Based on this reasoning, the court found that the
automatic designation provisions of the EJJ statute do not violate

156.
1996).
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

539 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995), review denied, (Minn. Jan. 25,
Seeid. at 411.
See id. at 410.
See id.
See MINN. STAT. § 260.126, subd. 1(2) (1998).
See L.J.S. &J T.K., 539 N.W.2d at 410.
See id. at 411.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 412.
See id.
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the separation of powers doctrine.' 69
The second constitutional case involves a Sixth Amendment
challenge. In this case, In re Welfare ofJ.KB.,"7 ° the juvenile asserted
he had been denied his constitutional right to be tried by a jury of
his peers because the jury pool did not contain anyone aged sixteen or seventeen."' The Minnesota Court of Appeals summarily
rejected this argument noting that age requirements for jury service have long been accepted as constitutional.72
The majority of cases since 1994, both certification and EJJ,
have involved sufficiency of the evidence challenges. As these cases
relate to the Ejj statute, the challenges take two forms: certified juveniles who assert the trial court erred by not designating them
EM;'173 and juveniles designated EM who assert they should not have
174
been. In all of these cases the courts have applied the "clearly erroneous" standard of review, the standard long used to review
transfer decisions.175 This standard recognizes the broad discretion
of the trial court. Thus, it is to be expected that reversal of trial
court decisions will be rare. As of the date of writing this article,
there are only two EJJ decisions, unpublished
at that, where the
76
trial court's determination has been reversed.
169. See id. at 411-12. In this consolidated appellate decision, the second juvenile, LJ.S., challenged the certification statute on the basis that the presumptive
certification provisions violate the principals of equal protection. See id. at 412.
The juvenile argued that there was no rational basis for distinguishing between the
presumptive and non-presumptive certification classifications. See id. The court of
appeals rejected this argument, finding that the age and offense criteria used were
relevant to the legitimate purpose of the statute. See id. L.J.S. also challenged the
presumptive certification provisions on due process grounds. See id. at 413. In rejecting this argument, the court of appeals noted that the presumption of certification is rebuttable and that the statute does not affect the state's burden of proof
as it relates to the underlying offense or offenses. See id.
170. 552 N.W.2d 732 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
171. See id. at 733.
172. See id. at 733-34.
173. See, e.g., In re Welfare of D.T.H., 572 N.W.2d 742, 745 (Minn. Ct. App.
1997), review denied, (Minn. Feb. 19, 1998); In re Welfare ofJ.S.J., 550 N.W.2d 290,
291 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); In reWelfare of S.J.G., 547 N.W.2d 456, 458 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996); In reWelfare of KM., 544 N.W.2d 781, 783 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
174. See In reWelfare of C.L.S., 558 N.W.2d 12, 14 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); In re
Welfare of S.W.N., 541 N.W.2d 14,17 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
175. See D.T.H., 572 N.W.2d at 745; JS.J, 550 N.W.2d at 291; S.J.G., 547
N.W.2d at 458; KM., 554 N.W.2d at 783; C.L.S., 558 N.W.2d at 14; S.W.N., 541
N.W.2d at 17.
176. See In re Welfare of D.M.D., No. C4-98-1185, 1999 WL 107800 (Minn. Ct.
App. Mar. 2, 1999), review granted, (Minn. May 18, 1999); In re Welfare of R.P.P.,
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Primarily, the focus of the appellate decisions has been on analyzing the trial court's application of the six public safety factors set
forth in the statute. The difficulty with this analysis is that the six
public safety factors that are to be used to support the EJJ designation are the same ones used in certification decisions. There has
been no indication by either the courts or the legislature as to
whether there is, or should be, any distinction between the two
types of proceedings.
As discussed earlier, the articulation in statute of the six public
safety factors to be used in both certification and EJJ cases was, in
part, designed to limit the subjectivity of the proceedings. Although there are few cases from which to evaluate the success of
this endeavor, it appears that the trial courts have retained a significant amount of discretion. The cases indicate that the public
safety factors serve to frame the analysis.' 7 However, the application of these factors to the unique facts of each case necessarily involves ajudge's subjective weighing of the evidence. The discretion
of the trial court is also affirmed by the standard used to review EJ1
designations.
The courts have given us some guidance on the meaning of
each of the six public safety factors. The first factor, the seriousness
of the offense, does not seem to generate much controversy. It appears generally accepted that allegations of78murder, sexual assault,
or the use of a firearm are serious offenses.
With respect to the second public safety factor, culpability, the
statute requires consideration of the child's involvement in the ofNo. C8-97-2135, 1998 WL 281911, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. June 2, 1998). See also in-

fta notes 202-207 and accompanying text (discussing need for nonoffense related
evidence of dangerousness).
177. See D.T.H., 572 N.W.2d at 743 (upholding the certification of a juvenile
on charges of first and second degree murder using an analysis that individually
addresses each of the public safety factors); JS.J, 550 N.W.2d at 291 (upholding
certification of juvenile on charges of numerous offenses, including assault, kidnapping, robbery and theft by evaluating the evidence in terms of each of the six
public safety factors); In re Welfare of D.E.F., No. C6-97-2344, 1998 WL 531757, at
*2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1998) (upholding designation as ED on charges of
criminal sexual conduct in the first degree by evaluating the evidence using each
of the six public safety factors); In re Welfare of G.L.D., No. C8-97-644, 1997 WL
680614, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1997) (upholding designation as EJJ on
charge of aggravated robbery by individually addressing each of the public safety
factors).
178. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125, subd. 2b(1) (1998); see also In re Welfare of
M.S.H., No. C1-95-1369, 1996 WL 5815, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.Jan. 9, 1996).
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fense, as well as the level of planning required. 79 Whether the offense is an intentional or unintentional crime has also been held to
be a factor in evaluating the child's culpability. 80 In the unpublished decision of In re Welfare of M.S.H.,'8' the juvenile was charged
with negligently causing an explosion and fire that destroyed or
damaged over forty buildings. 8 2 Because the crime was one of negligence, the child's culpability was held to be less than it would have
been had he been charged with an intentional crime.""
A child's mental condition is also relevant to the issue of culpability. The statute specifically provides that evaluating culpability
requires an examination of whether there is evidence of any mitigating factors recognized by the sentencing guidelines. 184 One of
the these recognized factors is whether the juvenile "because of
physical or mental impairment, lacked substantial capacity for
judgment when the offense was committed."' 85 In the case of a ju-

venile, this can often be a challenging determination. Parties are
dependent upon psychological evaluations and testing to give
guidance. As of the writing of this article, there have been no appellate decisions addressing the issue of competency as it relates to
the Ell offender. However, given this second public safety factor,
this appears to be an area that is ripe for litigation.
As to the third public safety factor, courts have broadly defined
what is meant by the term "prior delinquency history." In certification cases, Minnesota appellate courts have upheld the trial courts'
consideration of pending delinquency matters and unadjudicated
offenses when determining delinquency history. 186 The reasoning
of certification cases has been followed in Ell cases.' 87 Essentially,
the courts have held that this evidence is relevant to the ultimate
determination of dangerousness.1 8 In so holding, they have not
limited trial courts to a simple examination of the juvenile's history
of adjudicated offenses. Similarly, the fourth factor, prior pro179. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125, subd. 2b(2) (1998).
180. See M.S.H., 1996 WL 5815, at *1.
181. No. C1-95-1369, 1996 WL 5815, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.Jan. 9, 1996)
182. See id.
183. See id.
184. See MINN. STAT. § 260.125, subd. 2b(2) (1998).
185. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § I.D.2. (a) (3) (1998).
186. See In re Welfare of K.A.P., 550 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996).
187. See In reWelfare of D.E.F., No. C6-97-2344, 1998 WL 531757, at *3 (Minn.
Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1998); In re Welfare of T.H.W., No. CX-98-1045, 1998 WL
827908, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.Jan. 4, 1998).
188. See K.A.P., 550 N.W.2d at 12.
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gramming history, has been broadly defined. Family counseling,
informal counseling, school interventions, foster home placements
and parental attempts to modify behavior have all been included in
the definition of "programming."8 9
Decisions examining the fifth factor, the adequacy of punishment and programming within the juvenile system, often focus on
whether there is sufficient time to treat the child within the juvenile
system. With respect to certification, the cases focus on the lack of
time remaining for the juvenile to receive treatment.' 9° As expected, an Ejj designation appears to be the result when sufficient
time remains in the juvenile system for treatment. 9
It is often difficult to differentiate the sixth factor, dispositional options, from the adequacy of punishment and programming analyses of the fifth public safety factor. Both factors focus on
time remaining in the juvenile system. In Ramsey County, we have
interpreted the sixth public safety factor as requiring an examination of the length of time the offender would be in placement and
on probation for each of the dispositional options. Whether this
interpretation is correct will be left up to the courts.
Another issue that appears especially ripe for review by the
Minnesota Supreme Court is whether, in light of the statutory factors, prosecutors must still introduce independent evidence of
dangerousness. Prior to the 1994 changes to the certification statute and the creation of the EJJ designation, Minnesota law required
prosecutors to establish evidence of the juvenile's dangerousness
189. See In reWelfare of C.L.S., 558 N.W.2d 12, 16 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding family counseling a factor in programming); In re Welfare of M.S.H., No. Cl95-1369, 1996 WL 5815, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1996) (finding intervention a
factor in programming); D.E.F., 1998 WL 531757, at *3 (finding defendant's history in foster homes and shelters as a factor in programming).
190. See In re Welfare of D.N.G., No. C1-98-110, 1998 WL 665044, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Sept. 29, 1998), review denied, (Minn. Nov. 24, 1998). The trial court
noted that if D.N.G. remained in the juvenile system he would spend 18 months in
placement and would return to probation status until he turned 21. See id. at * 3.
Alternatively, if D.N.G. would be certified he would therefore receive a sentence of
approximately 300 months. See id. The trial court decided that the juvenile could
not be treated within the period of time remaining in juvenile jurisdiction, and
that certification was proper. See id. The court of appeals affirmed. See id. at *5.
See also In re Welfare of N.B., No. C6-96-1040, 1996 WL 722112, at *3 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 17, 1996), review denied, (Minn. Mar. 18, 1997); In re Welfare of A.W.S.,
No. C9-97-2273, 1998 WL 436907, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1998), review denied, (Minn. Sept. 22, 1998).
191. See In re Welfare of G.L.D., No. C8-97-644, 1997 WL 680614, at *3 (Minn.
Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1997).
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independent of the pending offense.
The reasoning behind this
requirement was simple: if the legislature had intended for the seriousness of the offense alone to be sufficient to transfer the case to
adult court, then9 3 it would have made the transfer mandatory for
certain offenses.

Despite the 1994 statutory changes, and the creation of the six
public safety factors, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has continued
to require this nonoffense-related evidence of dangerousness in
both certification and ED cases. In re Welfare of S. WN. 9 4 is the first
EM case to address this issue. In S. WN., the court of appeals ignored the fact that, except in prosecutor designated cases, the EJJ
designation requires the weighing of six public safety factors. 5
S.WN. did not address the fact that two of these six factors, prior
delinquency and prior programming history, focus on the child.
These factors, arguably, include consideration of nonoffenserelated evidence of dangerousness. The court also did not address
the legislative intent to make public safety the primary focus of the
proceedings. Rather, without significant analysis, the court simply
concluded that nonoffense-related evidence of dangerousness is
required to support an EJ designation.'9 6
In a recent certification case, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
called into question whether nonoffense-related evidence of
dangerousness must still be proved. This case, In re Welfare of
D. T.H.,7 correctly points out that the current statute does not specifically list nonoffense-related evidence of dangerousness as a required factor.'9 However, the court fell short of reversing S.WN.
and went on to find in the record sufficient evidence of
dangerousness to sustain the trial court's certification decision.' 99
Six months later, in an unpublished opinion, a different threejudge court of appeals panel reversed a lower court's E] designation. In this case, In re Welfare of R.P.P.,'0 the juvenile was charged
192. See In reWelfare of K.P.H., 289 N.W.2d 722, 725 (Minn. 1980); In reWelfare of Dahl, 278 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Minn. 1979).
193. See Dah, 278 N.W.2d at 320.
194. 541 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).

195.
196.

See id. at 17.
See id. at 16.

197. 572 N.W.2d 742 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), review denied, (Minn. Feb. 19,
1998). See also In re Welfare of S.R., No. C5-98-1776, 1999 WL 289257 (Minn. Ct.

App. May 11, 1999).
198. SeeD.T.H., 572 N.W.2d at 745.
199. See id.
200. No. C8-97-2135, 1998 WL 281911 (Minn. Ct. App.June 2, 1998).
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with assault in the first and second degree and reckless discharge of
a firearm.'
The court held that the lower court had properly
weighed the six public safety factors but had failed to make any
findings on the nonoffense-related evidence of dangerousness.0 2
This failure, the court of appeals concluded, constituted an abuse
203
of discretion.
The court, in R.P.P., reversed the Ejj determination and remanded the matter back to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with the holding.0 4 In a footnote, the court stated that
both parties questioned, during oral argument, the continued need
for evidence of dangerousness in light of the D.TH. decision.0 5
Without explaining its reasoning, the court summarily concluded
that D. T.H. was not relevant because it concerned certification to
adult court rather than an Eli designation. 20'

There was no recog-

nition of the fact that the six public safety factors are identical in
certification and EJJ proceedings. Further, the court did not articulate why there should be a distinction between EJJ and certification cases when it comes to nonoffense-related evidence of
dangerousness.
To further confuse the issue, one month after issuing the
RP.P decision, the court of appeals decided the case of In re Welfare of D.E.F. 207 In this unpublished decision, the court of appeals
upheld the trial court's ED designation despite the failure to make
specific findings as to nonoffense-related
evidence of
dangerousness. 208 While the opinion notes the trial court's failure
to make the requisite findings, it goes on to cite evidence from the
record which established sufficient evidence of dangerousness.
There is no apparent distinction between the RKP.P. and D.E.F.
cases. Both cases involve serious offenses. In R.P.P., the juvenile
was charged with committing an assault with a shotgun. 20 9 In D.E.E.,
210
the juvenile was accused of committing

a brutal sexual assault.

201. See id. at *1.
202. See id. at *2.
203. See id.
204. See id. at *3.
205. See id. at *2.
206. See id.
207. No. C6-97-2344, 1998 WL 531757 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 1998), review
denied, (Minn. Oct. 29, 1998).
208. See id. at *1.
209. See RP.P., 1998 WL 281911, at *2.
210. See D.E.E., 1998 WL 531757, at *1.
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Both appear to involve juveniles under the age of sixteen, although
the RP.P. opinion does not specifically state the juvenile's age but
only notes that it is a non-presumptive case. The only clear distinction is the make-up of the panels issuing the opinions. Recently,
the court of appeals has once again addressed the need for nonoffense-related evidence of dangerousness.
In In re Welfare of
D.M.D., the court reversed and remanded the case for further
findings of fact because the trial court had failed to find nonof212
fense-related evidence of dangerousness.
Charged with two
counts of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree, the prosecution moved to designate D.M.D. as an EJJ offender. 13 The trial
court weighed the six public safety factors set forth in the statute
and granted the motion for ED designation. 4 On appeal, the juvenile argued that the failure to find nonoffense-related evidence
of dangerousness constituted reversible error.215 The court of appeals agreed, noting that with the public safety factors split so
evenly,
. 216nonoffense-related evidence of dangerousness was required.
Although this is an unpublished decision, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has granted review.
With public safety now defined by the six statutory factors in
both certification and EM proceedings, the separate requirement of
nonoffense-related evidence of dangerousness appears inconsistent
with the 1994 statutory changes. The legislature did not see fit to
list it as a specific factor. In the author's experience, nonoffenserelated evidence of dangerousness, or the lack of such evidence, is
considered as part of a child's prior delinquency and programming
history. However, it should no longer be considered a prerequisite
to either certification or EJ designation. Furthermore, given the
lack of consistency in recent court of appeals decisions, D.M.D.
provides the Minnesota Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify this issue.
To date, only one reported appellate opinion has addressed
the issue of probation violations in EM cases: State v. Bradley, 27
211. No. C4-98-1185, 1999 WL 107800 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 1999), review
granted, (Minn. May 18, 1999).
212. See id. at *3.
213. Seeid. at*1.
214. See id. at *2.

215.
216.

See id. at *1.
See id. at *3.

217.

592 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
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which established an abuse of discretion standard of review.1 In
Bradley, the court upheld the revocation and execution of the adult
sentence, finding that no mitigating factors existed to justify continuing the stay.2

9

The decision draws a distinction between EJJ

and adult probation violation proceedings. Citing State v. Austin,2 °
the juvenile argued that his probation should not be revoked unless the need for incarceration "outweighed the policy favoring
probation."22' The appellate court rejected this standard, used in
adult proceedings, noting that the EJ statute presumes that, absent
mitigating factors, the court will impose an executed prison sentence. 222 The court held that, because of the unique characteristics
of the ED designation, trial courts are not required to consider
whether confinement outweighs the policy favoring probation. 22
In recognizing this fact, both the lower and appellate courts are ultimately responsible for determining whether the designation will,
in actuality, provide the juvenile with "one last chance" or more
than one last chance.
As a final note, there are a number of additional issues ripe for
appellate review. One such issue is how out-of-county EM cases
should be handled. The Juvenile Code provides that delinquents
may be prosecuted in the county in which the offense occurred or
in their county of residence. 4 The code further allows for venue
to be transferred to the juvenile's county of residence when the
transfer is in the "best interests of the child, society or the convenience of the proceedings." 2 5 It is usually most convenient for the
child to receive services in his or her own county of residence. Furthermore, the county of residence is financially responsible for the
juvenile's treatment and/or placement costs.2 2 6 Therefore, in the

author's experience virtually all juvenile dispositions are transferred to the child's county of residence. However, it is usually
preferable to prosecute the offense in the county where the offense
occurred. This is because most, if not all, of the witnesses will be
located in the county of offense.
218.

See id. at 887.

219.

See id.

220.
221.

295 N.W.2d 246 (Minn. 1980).
Bradley, 592 N.W.2d at 888 (citing Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250).

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

See id.
See id.
See MINN. STAT. § 260.121, subd. 1 (1998).
Id. § 260.121, subd. 2 (1998).
See id.
§ 256G.02, subd. 4 (1998).
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In light of this bifurcation of prosecution and disposition between counties, prosecutors struggle with how to handle the disposition and sentencing of EM offenders. The Juvenile Rules now
specifically allow for courts to transfer venue of both the juvenile
22
disposition and the adult sentencer.
However, as a practical matter, most plea negotiations require agreement on the adult sentence as well as on the juvenile disposition.
Prosecutors are reluctant to leave open the issue of the stayed
adult sentence. We want to be assured, as do victims, of an appropriate stayed sentence. Defense attorneys are equally reluctant to
expose their clients to an undetermined, albeit stayed, adult sentence. Consequently, in Ramsey County, we have negotiated the
stayed adult sentences in each of the out-of-county cases we have
prosecuted. The plea is taken and the stayed adult sentence imposed. Venue of the case is then transferred to the offender's
county of residence for juvenile disposition.
This situation poses a problem if the juvenile does not follow
the terms of probation or commits a new offense. The issue then
arises as to in which county the probation revocation proceedings
should be held. The staff within the juvenile's county of residence
has the most current information about the offender. However,
the juvenile may wish to have the violation proceedings heard by
the judge who imposed the original sentence. It has been the practice in Ramsey County to allow adult offenders to appear before the
same judge for sentencing if they so choose. However, in light of
the aforementioned Rule changes and the unique characteristics of
EM proceedings, it is questionable that EM
J offenders should be afforded this same privilege.
Another important issue recently addressed by the Minnesota
Court of Appeals is whether E J offenders are entitled to credit
against their adult sentences for time they have spent in juvenile
placement. 228 Under the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Procedure
Rule 18.06, subd. 1 (D), an EJM offender is entitled to credit against
their adult sentence for "time spent in custody."22 What Rule 18.06
means by "in custody" within this context is not defined in either
the certification or EMI statutes. 230 Under the general provisions of
227.

See MINN.R.Juv. P. 19.06, subd. 3.
See State v. Bowman, No. C7-98-1892, 1999 WL 153788 (Minn. Ct. App.
Mar. 23, 1999).
229. MiNN.R.Juv. P. 18.06, subd. 1(D).
230. See MNN.STAT. §§ 260.125 & .126 (1998).

228.
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the Juvenile Code, however, the term "custody" is used in the context of arrest and detention procedures for delinquent children.23'
The Task Force report states that it was their intention for credit to
be given only for the time a juvenile spends in a physically secure
juvenile facility.2 3 2

This interpretation, however, differs somewhat

from the laws governing adults. The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines specifically disallow credit for time spent in residential treatment facilities as a condition of a stay of imposition or execution of
a prison sentence. 233 Minnesota courts have specifically held that
placement in a2 secure
treatment facility does not alter the rule dis34
allowing credit.

The Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed this issue in its unpublished decision in State v. Bowman. 23 5 However, it did not base
its ruling on this distinction between secure and nonsecure facilities. Rather, the court found determinative the fact that the juvenile had been committed to the Commissioner of Corrections as
part of his juvenile disposition. 236 Following his commitment to the
Commissioner of Corrections, Bowman was placed at Red Wing, a
correctional facility for juveniles. 237 He later asked to have his
stayed adult sentence executed.2 3 The trial court declined to give

him credit against his adult sentence for the time spent at Red
Wing, but the court of appeals reversed this ruling, holding that
commitment to the Commissioner of Corrections and placement at
a correctional facility entitled Bowman to credit for time spent at

231. See MINN. STAT. § 260.165 (1998). The statute and the juvenile rules set
forth the requirements of taking a child into custody by a peace officer or probation officer. See MINN. R.Juv. P. 5.04.
232. See ADVISORY TASK FORCE, supra note 7, at 8. In its report, the Task Force
specifically recommended that the statute provide that "[a]nyjuvenile placed in a
physically secure juvenile program as a Serious Youthful Offender will receive
credit for that time if there is ever a commitment to prison for a probation violation." Id.
233. See MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND COMMENTARY § IIIC.04 (1998);

see also MINN. STAT. § 609.145, subd. 2 (1998); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 27.03, subd. 4(b).
234. See State v. Peterson, 359 N.W.2d 708, 710 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), review
denied, (Minn. Mar. 13, 1985) (holding that a defendant was not entitled to credit
for time spent at St. Peter Security Hospital receiving sex-offender treatment following conviction); see also State v. Marti, 372 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985).
235.

No. 37-98-1892, 1999 WL 153788 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1999).

236.

See id. at *1.

237.
238.

See id.
See id.
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Red Wing.!
Without explanation, the opinion distinguishes State
v. Peterson,2 which held that a defendant was not entitled to credit
for time at the State's Security Hospital in St. Peter.241 In drawing
the distinction based on commitment to either a correctional or
residential treatment facility, the court in Bowman appears to give
EJJ offenders the same protections afforded adults. Furthermore,
in the authors' opinion, it is critical to preserving the purpose of
the Ell statute. If EJJ offenders are placed in facilities that do not
have treatment as their primary focus, we will not be affording
them the "one last chance" promised.
Equally important, allowing credit for time spent in a treatment facility, whether secure or not, would undermine the efficacy
of the Ejj designation. Clearly one of the intentions of the stayed
adult sentence is to give juveniles the incentive to succeed on EJJ
probation. If the EJJ offender is given credit for the time spent in a
juvenile treatment facility, that incentive dwindles the longer he or
she is in placement. Furthermore, this would provide a disincentive for prosecutors to afford juveniles the "one last chance" of EJ
status.
V. CONCLUSION
It appears from the data that the legislative intent to give juvenile courts an additional sentencing option for the serious, violent
offender has been successful. To the extent that EJJ gives the court
and prosecutors an option short of prison for juveniles who are
amenable to treatment within the juvenile system, it is beneficial. It
allows prosecutors and judges, who often desire to give a child an
opportunity for rehabilitation, the ability to do so while fulfilling
their obligation to protect public safety. Carefully selecting those
juveniles to be designated Ejj is also critical. For the integrity of
the designation to be maintained, courts must be willing to follow
through and impose adult sentences if a juvenile violates his or her
EM probation.
Overall, EJJ appears to be a successful sentencing option. Subjectivity is still present in deciding whether a juvenile should be designated EMI; however, the statutory factors provide a framework of
analysis that can be objectively evaluated. How each factor is
239.
240.
241.

See id.
359 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
See id.
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weighed can never be reduced to a formula. The Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile statute was designed, to borrow from the words of
Graham Green, to open a door to the future forjuveniles who have
committed serious offenses but for whom rehabilitation in a juvenile setting meets the interests of public safety. Ultimately, the success of the Extended Jurisdiction Juvenile designation depends
upon prosecutors and courts using it wisely, and juveniles appreciating that this is a door that has been opened for them to let in a
better future.
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APPENDIX I

Variance Among The Minnesota Judicial Districts
in EJJ Designation By Offense Category

Designation
by Category

Judicial District
U

Property
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